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The introduction of a carbon emissions trading scheme, such as the proposed 
Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Commonwealth Department of 
Climate Change 2008), will involve significant costs to households, employees and 
businesses, while yielding long term net benefits to Australia and the world. In this 
respect, the Scheme is similar to previous microeconomic policy reforms in 
Australia, such as the restructuring of industry assistance policy from the early 
1970s to the 1990s (Quiggin 1996). 
The distributional consequences of previous reforms in Australia have been dealt 
with following two main principles. First, where reforms have generated additional 
revenue, this revenue has been redistributed to households in a way designed to 
ensure that most households, and particularly those on low incomes, are no worse 
off, on balance.  
Second, where reforms involve structural adjustment, workers, firms and 
communities have been given adjustment assistance to find new sources of 
employment and to offset the costs of structural change. However, owners of 
capital have not, in general, been compensated for the loss of future profits arising 
from policy changes.  
The current policy debate in Australia signals a possible departure from these 
long-standing principles by contemplating compensation to investors in industries 
such as brown coal generation, which are likely to be severely affected by the 
introduction of a carbon emissions trading scheme. These proposals are described 
in the Green Paper on a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Commonwealth 
Department of Climate Change 2008). The aim of this paper is to provide an 
analysis of the costs and benefits of departing from established practice by 
compensating investors in affected industries. 3 
This paper is organised as follows.  The general principles of compensation for 
changes in policy are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 focuses both on the 
international experience and on the current policy debate in Australia regarding 
the allocation of free permits to compensate industries for the introduction of a 
carbon emissions trading scheme. Section 4 deals with the treatment of emissions-
intensive tradeable goods. In Section 5, estimates are presented of the effects of the 
introduction of an emissions trading scheme and a cap on emissions (with a range 
of implicit carbon prices) on the profitability of electricity generators.  
2. General principles of adjustment assistance 
In considering whether the proposed carbon emissions trading scheme should 
constitute an exception to established principles regarding adjustment to changes 
in Australian public policy, it is important to consider whether reasonable 
investors should have anticipated the introduction of an emissions trading scheme, 
or similar measures aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. 
The physics of the greenhouse effect have been understood since the work of 
Arrhenius (1896) around the turn of the 20th century. The possibility of human-
caused global warming was discussed by the US National Academy of Sciences in 
the 1970s (United States Committee for the Global Atmospheric Research Program 
1975), but it was unclear at this time whether warming would be outweighed by 
natural or anthropogenic cooling associated with such factors as the emission of 
aerosols from industrial processes.  
By 1988, concern about human-caused climate change had become sufficient to 
justify the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) by the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization. From 
this point onwards, standard business practice required that reasonable investors 
should have taken account of the possible implications of global warming and 
measures proposed to mitigate it. Early Australian studies of the issue included an 
analysis by the Industry Commission (1991). 4 
The IPCC issued its first assessment report in 1990 (Houghton, Jenkins and 
Ephraum 1990), and a second assessment report in 1995 (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change 1995). The second IPCC report found that climate had changed 
over the past century and while many uncertainties remained, ‘the balance of 
evidence suggests a discernible human impact on climate’.  
The first international policy response was the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change signed by Australia in 1992, which, despite 
carefully flexible language, was generally understood as embodying a commitment 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The general language of the Framework 
Convention was converted to more specific comments in the Kyoto Protocol to the 
Convention, which was agreed to in 1997, and came into force in 2005 following 
ratification by all major emitters except the United States and Australia. 
In negotiations leading up to the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, a clear preference 
became evident for market-based approaches such as emissions trading schemes, 
as opposed to direct regulatory controls on production processes (the ‘command and 
control’ approach). The Australian delegation played a central role in this process, 
reflecting extensive analysis of the policy implications of emissions trading 
undertaken by the Australian government and its research agencies including the 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (1995, 1997, 1998), the 
Bureau of Transport Economics (1998) and the Industry Commission (1991). 
Investors have had 20 years’ warning of the possibility that action would be taken 
to mitigate global warming. It has been at least 10 years since the Australian 
government indicated its willingness to meet specific targets for reductions in 
carbon emissions, with a preference for market-based policies such as emissions 
trading schemes. Few policy changes in Australian history have come with such 
lengthy advance notice.  
To assess the adequacy of information for investors in the electricity industry, it is 
useful to examine the history of investment in the industry. Electricity generation 
assets in Victoria and South Australia, the two states most reliant on brown coal, 
were privatised in the 1990s. Most of the Victorian assets were later resold by the 5 
initial buyers. Hazelwood power station, among the power stations most likely to 
close as a result of the introduction of an emissions trading scheme, was expected 
to close in the 1990s, but was extensively refurbished following its privatisation. 
Thus, it is, in effect a new asset. Assuming due diligence, the existing owners of 
brown coal power stations acquired these assets in full knowledge that they might 
be subject to restrictions on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. 
It might be argued that the sale value of assets was reduced when, around 1988, 
the possibility of climate change mitigation policies became evident, and that the 
owners of the assets at that time (namely, state governments) deserve 
compensation. On standard assumptions about commercial discount rates and 
depreciation however, the proportion of asset value accounted for by earnings over 
20 years in the future is modest. Assuming, say, a real discount rate of 8 per cent 
and depreciation of 5 per cent, the residual value of an asset 20 years in the future 
is about 6 per cent of its current value. Such losses are small in relation to those 
associated with normal commercial risks. 
Furthermore, one needs to consider the effects of compensation on dynamic 
efficiency. More specifically, a decision to compensate investors who chose the 
'wrong bet' might treat unfairly those investors who, understanding the risks 
involved, decided not to invest in brown coal generation. It is well known that 
moral hazard might emerge when investors do not face the full cost of their 
decisions.   
The case of tariff policy: a comparison 
One of the most important processes of industry adjustment in Australia has been 
the reform of industry assistance policy and, in particular, tariff policy. In 1972, 
tariff protection had been a central element of Australian industry policy for more 
than 60 years. Although some academic debate on the topic had emerged in the 
late 1960s, the policy was barely debated in public (Quiggin 1996). 
In 1973, the Whitlam Labor government cut tariffs by 25 cent and initiated a 
process of tariff reform, converting the Tariff Board into the Industries Assistance 6 
Commission, the predecessor of the Productivity Commission. The process slowed 
down under the Fraser Coalition government, but by the early 1990s, the policy of 
tariff protection had been effectively abolished.  
In the course of this process, the share of import-competing manufacturing in the 
Australian economy declined dramatically. Large numbers of firms closed down or 
relocated production overseas. Governments undertook a wide range of adjustment 
policies to assist displaced workers, and to facilitate movement into alternative 
sources of employment. Adversely affected communities also received assistance in 
the development of new industries. 
Although adjustment policy was the subject of wide-ranging debate, the idea of 
compensating owners of capital for foregone profits was not even raised, let alone 
implemented. (See, for example, Productivity Commission 1998). Where firms 
received adjustment assistance, the aim was to encourage the transition to new 
and more socially productive activities, not to maintain existing production 
patterns. 
3. Free emissions permits and grandfathering 
The term ‘grandfather clause’ arose in the Southern United States after the Civil 
War and Reconstruction eras, when resurgent white elites sought to exclude blacks 
(and sometimes poor whites) from voting, by restricting the franchise to men whose 
grandfathers had been entitled to vote before the War. Such clauses were 
eventually ruled unconstitutional (BlackPast.org 2008). 
Despite these unsavory origins, the terms ‘grandfather clause’ and ‘grandfathering’ 
have come to be used as a neutral description of any element of a policy program in 
which existing participants in an activity are protected from the impact of 
regulations, restrictions or charges applied to new entrants. Grandfathering has 
been particularly common in the development of policies to control pollution in the 
United States, where the Clean Air Act Extension of 1970 drew a sharp distinction 
between new and existing sources of pollution. 7 
Two main forms of grandfathering have been used, depending in part on the form 
of regulation applied to pollution. Where point sources of pollution are required to 
adopt particular control technologies, or to limit the volume of emissions, existing 
sources may be exempted from the requirement, or subjected to less stringent 
restrictions than new sources. Where an aggregate limit is applied to pollution or 
some other environmentally damaging activity, existing sources may be granted 
permits, while new entrants may be required to buy permits, or to undertake 
offsetting activity. 
International experience of grandfathering in emissions trading schemes 
The first emissions trading schemes were mandated by the 1990 amendments to 
the US Clean Air Act (first passed in 1963) and covered the emission of sulphur 
dioxide (SO2) (US Environmental Protection Authority 2008). Title IV of the Act set 
a goal of reducing annual SO2 emissions by 10 million tons below 1980 levels. To 
achieve these reductions, the law required a tightening of the restrictions placed on 
power plants that relied on fossil fuels.  
Phase I began in 1995 and affected 263 units at 110 mostly coal-burning electric 
utility plants located in 21 eastern and Midwestern states. An additional 182 units 
joined Phase I of the program as substituting or compensating units. Emissions 
data indicate that, under Phase I, SO2 emissions at these units were reduced by 
almost 40 percent below their required level.  
Phase II started in 2000. Annual emissions limits imposed on these large, higher 
emitting plants were tightened. In addition, restrictions were imposed on smaller, 
cleaner plants fired by coal, oil, and gas. The program now covers all new 
generating units and existing units with an output capacity of greater than 25 
megawatts.  
The US SO2 emissions permit trading system evolved from more limited forms of 
offsets, which in turn evolved from a fixed regulation. The starting point implied 
100 per cent grandfathering, since companies did not have to pay anything to emit 
their regulated quantity. To establish an auction market, the US Environmental 8 
Protection Authority withdrew around 3 per cent of allowable emissions permits, 
and sold these at auction.  
Under the cost-based regulatory system that prevailed when the SO2 emissions 
trading scheme was introduced, electricity prices were adjusted in line with costs, 
so that they would be unlikely to change as a result of the issue of free permits. 
However, with deregulation, market prices would be expected to incorporate the 
opportunity cost of permits, whether they w e r e  i s s u e d  f r e e l y  o r  b o u g h t  i n  t h e  
market. Thus, the allocation of free permits represented an effective transfer from 
consumers to generators. However, because the permit program evolved gradually 
from a system of regulatory controls, with allocation of permits to generators being 
the default choice, this issue did not raise significant concern. 
The European experience with CO2 emissions trading is more directly relevant to 
the choices faced in Australia. In the first trading period, from 2005 to 2007, 
emissions permits were required for the power and heat generation industry and in 
selected energy-intensive industrial sectors. As in the US SO2 emissions trading 
system, generators were allocated free permits in the first phase of the European 
emissions trading scheme (European Commission 2008). 
Unlike the US case, the free issue of permits has been the subject of intense 
controversy. Critics such as Grubb (2006) focused attention on electricity sector 
profits from the combination of free allowances and the passing through of 
increased costs to final consumers. The second phase of the scheme maintained the 
practice of issuing free permits. However, the European Commission has proposed 
auctioning 60 per cent of permits in the Third Phase, beginning in 2013, and an 
increasing proportion thereafter. 
The policy of auctioning permits is gaining increased acceptance. The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative is a co-operative effort to reduce CO2 emissions from 
power plants by ten north-eastern and Mid-Atlantic States in the United States. 
Under this scheme, which starts in 2009, there will be no free allocation of permits 
to electricity generators (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2008). 9 
In summary, international experience with grandfathering pollution permits 
cautions against a generous free allocation, which can lead to an increase in profits 
in the electricity industry given the ability of generators to pass the increased costs  
on to consumers.  
Current policy discussions 
In recent discussions of the design of an emissions trading scheme for Australia, 
grandfathering has been a central issue. Different forms of grandfathering have 
been proposed in different cases. 
Exemptions from participation in the scheme have been proposed for some sectors, 
both on grounds of practicality (such as the difficulty of assessing and monitoring 
emissions from agriculture) and on the grounds that trade-exposed, energy 
intensive industries should not be required to reduce emissions in the absence of a 
more comprehensive international agreement. It has also been suggested that the 
impact of the scheme on motor transport should be offset by reductions in fuel 
taxes. 
Garnaut (2008) argues that current emitters should not receive free permits and 
offers a number of supporting arguments. First, the costs of emissions permits, like 
other costs of production, will ultimately be passed on to consumers, so there is no 
need to compensate producers through the allocation of free permits. This 
argument will be formalised below.  
Second, Australian governments have not, in general, compensated asset owners 
for losses associated with economic reforms or resulting from the internalisation of 
externalities. In general, it has been assumed that such losses are similar in 
character to those arising from adverse changes in demand patterns or from the 
entry of new competitors, and that firms and investors should use their own 
judgement. 
Third, structural adjustment measures would be more appropriate than 
compensation. Structural assistance includes measures to help displaced workers 
to find new jobs, and to encourage the establishment of new industries in 10 
communities affected by structural change. In addition, such assistance could 
include incentives for investment in lower emissions technologies such as carbon 
capture and storage.  In Garnaut's view, these alternative structural adjustment 
assistance measures are likely to yield greater benefits than compensation to 
owners of electricity generating plants. 
Analysis 
Where pollution control takes the form of specific technological requirements, or 
plant-level restrictions on emissions, grandfathering may be technologically 
efficient, at least in the ‘static’ case where the policy is implemented, and the firm’s 
responses are determined in a one-shot game. This is because the cost of complying 
with new requirements will generally be greater for old plants than for newer ones, 
a point that may be made formally in terms of putty–clay technology. 
In the case of tradeable emissions permits, a static analysis suggests that the 
consequences of grandfathering, in the form of free allocation of permits, are purely 
distributional. Trade should ensure that the final allocation of permits is consistent 
with efficiency in reducing emissions to the aggregate target level. 
In a dynamic analysis however, it is necessary to take account of the incentive 
effects on investment choices that arise if grandfathering is anticipated as a 
feature of future policy changes. In the presence of fully anticipated 
grandfathering, firms will not invest in emissions-reducing technology even if they 
expect policy changes that will increase the cost of emissions. 
It follows that grandfathering should be considered as a last resort. In general, 
owners of capital should not be compensated for policy changes that might 
reasonably be anticipated. Any form of compensation to owners of capital distorts 
investment decisions. 11 
4. Treatment of emissions-intensive tradeable goods 
In the absence of a global agreement on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, 
the adoption of measures to reduce emissions in individual countries can have 
perverse effects.  
Currently the international framework governing the emission of greenhouse gases 
is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, operationalised 
in the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention, which was adopted in 1997 and came into 
force in 2005. All major emitters, with the exception of the United States have 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol. However, following a change of government in 2006, 
Canada indicated that it would not fulfil its obligations under the Protocol. Thus, 
until the first commitment period under the Protocol ends in 2012, the only 
significant competition from non-compliant firms is that from the United States 
and Canada. Australian policymakers should seek to encourage these countries to 
return to compliance with the commitments made in Kyoto.  
In the discussion leading up to the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, it was 
envisaged that an initial phase in which developed countries would reduce their 
emissions would be followed by a global agreement encompassing emissions from 
both developed and developing countries. Subsequent discussion has produced 
widespread acceptance of a ‘contract and converge’ model. In this model, all 
countries would agree to move, over the period between the present and 2050, to a 
common level of per capita emissions consistent with stabilisation of global 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at levels leading to warming of 2 
degrees Celsius relative to pre-industrial levels. 
Adoption of this, or any other comprehensive agreement, will require agreement 
from developing countries, most importantly China and India, to limit growth in 
emissions of greenhouse gases and, if the agreed final level is below current 
emissions, ultimately to reduce emissions levels. 
At this stage it is unclear whether major emitters such as China and India will 
agree to accept quantitative emissions targets. Even assuming successful 12 
negotiation of an agreement with these countries, it is necessary to consider the 
possibility that other countries will remain outside a new agreement, or will fail to 
comply with their obligations. 
A global agreement to reduce emissions will be undermined if emissions-intensive 
industrial activities are relocated to countries that decline to participate in such an 
agreement. It is desirable that Australian industries should not be disadvantaged 
in competition with firms located in non-compliant countries. However, this should 
not be regarded as the basis for an open-ended commitment to assist emissions-
intensive industries, and should not reward the adoption of emissions-intensive 
technologies. 
Assistance to emissions-intensive industries should be treated as a precautionary 
response to the possibility that no satisfactory successor to the Kyoto Protocol will 
emerge. It should be made clear in international negotiations that, in markets 
where all major participants are compliant, Australian firms will be required to 
participate in the emissions trading scheme and will not receive any special 
assistance. In particular, this policy should be applied even where, as in the Kyoto 
Protocol, an international agreement allows for differentiated emissions targets 
based on the circumstances of particular countries. 
Any measure to assist export-oriented industries should be matched by assistance 
to import-competing industries in competition with competitors located in non-
compliant industries, preferably in the form of taxes or quotas on imports from 
non-compliant countries. Since failure to comply with a global agreement is an 
unfair subsidy, such measures are consistent with the spirit of the agreements 
establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In the event that any technical 
difficulties arise in relation to the WTO, Australia should support renegotiation of 
the WTO agreement to make explicit the right of compliant countries to respond to 
the unfair practices in non-compliant countries.  13 
5. Grandfathering: a market analysis 
This section provides a conceptual framework to determine the level of 
compensation, in terms of free carbon emissions permits that would make a 
representative firm in a given market indifferent between being included in, or 
excluded from, an emissions trading scheme. In this simple framework we consider 
a representative firm that is subject to perfect competition in the output market. 
We assume that the supply of electricity is given by S(p,pe), where p and pe denote, 
respectively, output and emission permit prices and demand for electricity is given 
by D(p). We abstract from distribution and transmission charges and consider a 
vertically integrated generator/retailer who faces perfect competition downstream.  
In this setting, if the target quantity of emissions is q*e  , then the equilibrium 
output price  p*, the equilibrium output quantity q*, and the equilibrium price of 
emissions p*e  satisfy the following:  
qe(p,pe) = q*e, 
S(p*,p*e) = D(p*) = q* 
where qe(p,pe)  is input demand for emissions. Let 
se = (peqe)/pq 
be the cost share of emissions, assuming competitive pricing so that pq is equal to 
the total cost of producing q units of output. 
Letting  p0 be the equilibrium price when pe  =  0, we have, for small changes in 
emissions around  p0, 
 (p*- p0)/ sep0 = ρ /(ρ + ε) = γ, 
where ρ is the (price) elasticity of supply and ε is the (price) elasticity of demand. 
In the case where emissions intensity cannot be adjusted, therefore, a 
representative firm will have profit unchanged if g = ( 1-γ) q*e permits are issued. 
It is generally assumed that the elasticity of supply greatly exceeds the elasticity of 
demand, both in the short run and in the long run.  14 
In the short run, the elasticity of supply in the electricity market is determined by 
the bidding behaviour of market participants. Observations on the bid curve 
suggest that the short-run elasticity of supply is likely to be in the range 0.5 to 1. 
The short-run elasticity of demand for electricity is close to zero, perhaps 0.1. In 
the long run, estimates of the elasticity of demand are close to 1, while under 
standard assumptions the elasticity of supply is very large (with constant returns 
to scale at the industry level, the elasticity of supply is infinite). In both cases, 
supply is substantially more elastic than demand. 
It follows that, in a homogenous industry, if the policy objective were to leave the 
welfare of industry participants unchanged, g, the optimal proportion of permits to 
be allocated freely, would be small, since most cost increases will be passed on to 
consumers. With a short-run elasticity of supply equal to 0.5 and elasticity of 
demand equal to 0.2 (assumptions that are respectively conservative and 
optimistic), the optimal proportion of freely allocated permits would be below 30 
per cent. More plausible parameter values would suggest that free permits should 
be no more than 15 per cent of the total. 
5. Treatment of Electricity Generators 
The Green Paper on a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Commonwealth 
Department of Climate Change 2008) indicates that assistance to deal with the 
effects of a carbon emissions trading scheme should be provided to generators of 
coal-fired electricity, but does not nominate a preferred delivery mechanism. The 
latter perspective is consistent with long-standing practice in adjustment 
assistance policy. Governments have long provided assistance to enable firms to 
reorient production activities and avoid or reduce redundancies, and to assist 
workers and communities in the adjustment to changing patterns of employment. 
By contrast, as noted above, the suggestion that owners of capital assets should be 
compensated for changes in government policy that reduce the expected flow of 
income from those assets represents a radical innovation. 15 
It may be argued, however, that as coverage will initially be partial, particular 
groups of emitters, would seek to delay their inclusion in an emissions trading 
scheme if compensation were not provided. An appropriate compensation 
mechanism would reduce the incentive to lobby for exemptions from the scheme.  
This argument raises the question of how to estimate the appropriate level of 
compensation. One possible response to this question is to estimate the volume of 
free permits that would leave existing emitters no worse off than in the absence of 
the scheme.  
Simulation analysis 
The theoretical analysis presented in Section 5 incorporates a number of 
simplifying assumptions. Most notably, the electricity supply industry is treated as 
homogenous, allowing the derivation of effects on a representative firm. In reality, 
electricity generation is undertaken using a variety of technologies and fuels. The 
most emissions-intensive plants are those fired by brown coal (primarily in 
Victoria), followed by black coal-fired plants. With the exception of hydro-electric 
generation , where there is little scope for expansion, and renewable sources such 
as wind energy (still a very small share of the total), the least emissions-intensive 
generators are those fired by natural gas. Closed-cycle natural gas plants have 
lower emissions, but higher capital costs, than open-cycle plants. 
In addition, the vertically separated structure of the electricity supply industry 
means that the price paid by consumers is not equal to the price received by 
generators. Transmission and distribution costs contribute around $0.03–0.05/kWh 
($30–$50/MWh) to the retail price of electricity (National Electricity Code 
Administrator 2002), and retailers’ margins increase the price by around 10 per 
cent. 
The spot price received by electricity generators is determined by the operations of 
the National Electricity Market (NEM) established in 1998 Under the NEM, the 
electricity price is set in a pool market at intervals of 30 minutes by matching bids, 
submitted by generators with demand from electricity users and retailers (National 16 
Electricity Market Management Company 2008). Prices in peak periods are 
significantly higher than in off-peak periods. In periods of high demand and when 
significant generators are off-line due to breakdowns or maintenance, prices can 
reach very high levels, capped under the NEM at $10 000/MWh. 
Because of capacity constraints on interstate connections, the price of electricity 
differs between states, although prices tend to move together. For the purposes of 
this study, we will focus attention on the price in New South Wales, using data  for 
2007 derived from Liam can you supply details here, please  
This simplification is based on the implicit assumption that the effects of 
transmission interconnector  constraints do not vary significantly over time, and 
therefore that the price in one state can be treated as representative of the market 
as a whole. Additional simplifications include the exclusion from consideration of 
the current state-based emissions abatement and technology enhancement 
schemes.  
More importantly we simplify by considering the market as having only two 
components: peak and off-peak, and we treat the observed distribution of market 
outcomes in 2007 (referred to as the Base Case) as representative of market 
behaviour in the absence of a carbon emissions trading scheme. Table 1 shows the 
average electricity price for New South Wales for all periods, for peak and for off-
peak, expressed in $/MWh. 
Table 1: Average electricity prices for New South Wales in 2007, $/MWh 
(Base Case). 
 
Average Price  67.07 
Peak Average Price  97.95 
Off_-Peak Average Price  44.98 
 17 
Simulation approach 
The approach used to simulate the introduction of a carbon emissions trading 
scheme involves a number of steps.  The first step is to simulate the bidding 
behavior of generators. For each class of generators, we use data from ACIL 
Tasman (2007) on short-run marginal costs, medium-term variable costs and 
average availability. We construct a supply curve based on the assumption that 
firms are willing to supply electricity at prices equal to or greater than their short-
run marginal cost, provided that average returns are sufficient to cover medium-
term variable costs.  This gives rise to an order of merit for peak and off-peak 
production.  
We then construct, from observed market outcomes, the distribution of quantities 
demanded at market clearing prices for each half-hour period in 2007. For periods 
when average availability exceeds demand, we assume that supply is allocated 
according to the merit order, with price being determined by the short-run 
marginal cost of the marginal supplier. For peak periods when demand exceeds 
average availability, we assume that the amount supplied increases 
proportionately for each class of generator, reflecting the capacity to increase 
availability in periods of high demand. For these periods, the observed market-
clearing price is received by all generators. 
Next we simulate the introduction of an emissions trading scheme. We assume 
that all firms increase their bids by an amount given by 
Δ = pe*(qe/q)*θ, 
where Δ is the increase in bids, pe is the price of emissions permits, qe/q is the 
emissions intensity ratio (that is, the quantity of emissions per unit of output) and 
θ is the pass-through factor. 
This formulation requires some simplifying assumptions. First, it is assumed that 
the scheme gives rise to a market price for permits which is stable over the course 
of a given year. Depending on the design of the scheme, this market price might be 
an upper limit, reached under ‘safety-valve’ arrangements such as those proposed 18 
by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002). Alternatively, the price may be the equilibrium 
value reached in the national market for emissions permits.  
In addition, it is assumed that prices are not constrained by retail price caps. The 
introduction of a carbon emissions trading scheme requires that, if such price caps 
are retained, they should be adjusted to allow generators to pass on the cost of 
emissions permits.  
The emissions permit price pe is stated in terms of the price for a permit to emit 
one tonne of CO2. A range of values for pe, from $A20 to $A50 is considered. Values 
for the emissions intensity factor (qe/q) are given by Table 2. 
Table 2: Emissions intensity factors for electricity generation 
technologies 
Generation Technology  Emissions Intensity1 
Hydro-electricity 0 
Closed Cycle Gas Turbine  0.5 
Open Cycle Gas Turbine  0.6 
Black Coal  1 
Brown Coal  1.3 
1. Tonnes of CO2  emitted for each MWh generated 
 
In the simulations reported here, we assume θ = 1 (full pass-through of costs to 
consumers). Other simulations, available as an Appendix from the authors, show 
that results are generally robust to the use of values of θ as low as 0.8. 
The next step in the modeling process is estimation of the change in equilibrium 
average prices for peak and off-peak electricity supply, after taking account of 
demand responses. Assuming that the short-run elasticity of demand is equal to 
0.2 for retail electricity, and that approximately half of all costs are associated with 19 
the distribution and retail sectors, we estimate the derived short-run elasticity of 
demand for electricity in the wholesale market to be 0.1. 
After taking account of demand responses to the shift in market supply associated 
with the requirement to buy emissions permits, it is possible to estimate the 
change in market price, the change in emissions and the changes in revenues and 
profits for each class of generators. 
Results 
As noted above, the crucial determinant of supply response is the ‘merit order’ 
associated with the market, ranking electricity suppliers from lowest cost to 
highest cost. Initially, brown coal-fired baseload stations are the least-cost 
suppliers. However, at an emissions permit price of $26/tonne, the short-run 
marginal costs of brown coal, black coal and gas-fired power are approximately 
equal. At higher emissions permit prices, brown coal stations are displaced in the 
merit order by gas and black coal. 
At emissions permit prices of around $30/tonne, brown coal power stations cease to 
cover their long-run variable costs of operation, and will therefore shut down. The 
first plants to close will be those with high long-run variable costs of operation, and 
relatively short remaining lives, such as Hazelwood in Victoria. 
Table 3 provides a summary of average electricity prices for the various emissions 







Table 3: Electricity price outcomes with a range of carbon emission 
permit prices 
 
Emissions permit price  









0 67.07  97.95  44.98 
20 84.53  109.95  66.34 
25 89.57  112.95  72.84 
30 94.61  115.95  79.34 
40 104.69  121.95  92.33 
50 114.77  127.95  105.33 
 
Two features of Table 3 are particularly notable. First, the average electricity price 
(expressed in $/MWh) increases by approximately one dollar for each one dollar 
increase in the emissions permit price, (expressed in $/tonne of CO2 emitted). This is 
consistent with the observation, from Table 2 above, that the emissions intensity 
for most kinds of electricity generation is around 1 tonne/MWh. Second, the 
increase in off-peak prices is greater than the increase in peak prices. This reflects 
the fact that the main fuel used in baseload generation (that is, in both peak and 
off-peak periods) is coal, while gas-fired generation is used only in peak periods, 
except when emissions permit prices are high enough to displace brown coal. 
The change in CO2 emissions associated with a given emissions permit price may 
now be estimated.  The change in emissions is determined by the change in  the 
mix of generation technologies arising from the change in merit order caused by 
the introduction of emissions trading and by the reduction in demand for electricity 
associated with higher electricity prices. Table 4 shows the relationship between 
emissions permit prices, electricity demand, and emissions of CO2 from electricity 
generation. 21 
Table 4: Effects of carbon emissions permit prices on electricity demand 
and CO2 emissions 
 
Emissions permit 
price ($/tonne of 




Reduction in CO2 
emissions (per cent) 
CO2 emissions 
(million tonnes) 
0 0 0  184 
20 2.9 2.9  179 
25 3.6 8.1  169 
30 4.3  10.1  165 
40 5.7  11.8  162 
50 6.9  13.4  159 
When reading Table 4, it is important to note that, under an emissions trading 
scheme, the volume of permits issued determines the market-clearing price for 
emissions permits, and not vice versa. The final column of Table 4 shows the 
reduction in the volume of allowable  carbon emissions for the electricity industry 
that would be associated with the market-clearing prices for emissions permits 
presented in the first column. 
The final stage of the simulation consists of calculating the changes in the profits  
of electricity generators after the introduction of a carbon emissions trading 
scheme compared to the benchmark where no permit is required and the implied 
price for CO2  emissions is zero. In this calculation we assume that generators only 
sell in the spot market and there is no hedging.  
Table 5 summarises the results of this calculation. Only brown coal generators are 
made worse off by the introduction of an emissions trading scheme. The profits of 
black coal generators are broadly unchanged, reflecting the fact that the emissions 
intensity of black coal generation is about equal to that for the electricity industry 
as a whole. Gas generators gain substantially, since their emissions intensity is 
below that for the industry as a whole. As a result, the increase in electricity prices 
paid by consumers when the cost emissions permits is passed on to them more than 
compensates gas generators for the permits they are required to purchase. 
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Table 5: Changes in profits for electricity generators resulting from a 
carbon emissions trading scheme 
 
Carbon emissions
permit price ($/t) 
Change in generators’ profits (per cent) 




20 -31  2  53  66 
25 -29  3  57  72 
30 -28  4  60  - 
35 -27  5  63  79 
40 -27  5  64  81 
50 -26  6  67  84 
 
Additional modeling, not reported here, shows that this conclusion is robust to 
changes in assumptions about the extent to which generators pass on cost 
increases to consumers through changes in their bids. Even with 80 per cent pass 
through, which implies either restrictions on retail price increase or a substantial 
divergence from competitive behaviour, the main loss falls on brown coal 
generators, though black coal generators suffer modest losses. 
The analysis supports the conclusion that policy attention should be focused on 
generators using brown coal. However, it does not support the view that the main 
concern should of policy should be to mitigate losses incurred by the owners of such 
generators. 
The primary implication of the analysis is that substantial reductions in emissions 
will be achieved only when existing brown coal generators are replaced by other 
sources of electricity or by electricity conservation. In the short run adjustment 
modeled here, this would be achieved by increasing the availability and output of 23 
existing gas-fired plants, and by the demand-reducing effects of higher electricity 
prices.  
In the longer term, adjustment will include the construction of new low-emissions 
electricity generating plants, and, if technological difficulties can be overcome, the 
adoption of carbon capture and sequestration technology. Cost-effective carbon 
capture would probably require the construction of new plants, although 
retrofitting remains a possibility. 
The process of adjustment is usually a difficult and painful one for the workers and 
communities affected. The primary focus of government policy should be on 
assisting workers to find new jobs and assisting communities to expand alternative 
sources of employment. In the context of the La Trobe valley in Victoria, where 
most brown coal generators are located, this might include assistance with the 
adoption and implementation of carbon capture and sequestration technology. 
Resources diverted to compensating the owners of existing capital for reductions in 
the value of capital assets are not available to support the adjustment of workers 
and communities. Any payments made to owners of existing assets should be used 
to assist this adjustment process, for example by assisting owners of coal-fired 
plants to implement emission-reducing technologies such as coal-drying, or to 
develop methods for carbon capture and sequestration. 
6. Conclusions 
Adjustment assistance policies associated with the introduction of a carbon 
emissions trading scheme should be based on the established policy framework 
developed in previous processes of microeconomic reform. In this framework, policy 
effort is focused primarily on mitigating the adverse impacts of reform on workers 
and communities, rather than on seeking to compensate owners of capital. In 
particular, suggestions that investors in assets affected by the scheme require 
special treatment to maintain confidence are without merit. In fact, such investors 
have had much more time to prepare for policy change than have those affected by 
earlier rounds of microeconomic reform. 24 
Assistance to energy-intense trade-exposed industries should only be provided to 
the extent that Australian firms face competition from non-compliant countries. In 
particular, exporting and input-competing emissions intensive industries should 
receive comparable assistance. Assistance to input-competing emissions intensive 
industries should take the firm of countervailing duties applied to imports from 
non-compliant countries rather than subsidies to Australian producers. 
For the electricity sector as a whole, assuming competitive pricing, most of the 
costs of an emissions trading scheme will be borne by consumers. Retail price caps, 
if retained, should be adjusted to ensure that consumers receive an appropriate 
price signal. Our estimates indicate that adverse effects on producers will be 
confined to brown coal generators.  Any effective scheme to reduce carbon 
emissions is likely to require the closure of some brown coal generators. However, 
adjustment assistance should be directly primarily towards enabling workers, 
firms and communities to deal with the consequences of plant closures rather than 
towards compensating investors. 
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